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ABSTRACT
Following contentious debates around the status and justifiability of 
illegal direct actions by animal rights activists, we introduce a here-
tofore unexplored perspective that argues they are neither terrorist 
nor civilly disobedient but ethically vigilante. Radical animal rights 
movement (RARM) activists are vigilantes for vulnerable animals 
and their rights. Hence, draconian measures by the constitutional 
state against RARM vigilantes are both disproportionate and ille-
gitimate. The state owes standing and toleration to such principled 
vigilantes, even though they are self-avowed anarchists and anti-stat-
ists—unlike civil disobedients—repudiating allegiance to the con-
stitutional order. This requires the state to acknowledge the ethical 
nature of challenges to its present regime of toleration, which assigns 
special standing to illegal actions in defense of human equality, but 
not equality and justice between humans and animals.
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Introduction
We explore the normative status of illegal actions under-
taken by the Radical Animal Rights Movement (RARM), such 
as animal rescue, trespass, and sabotage as well as confronta-
tion and intimidation. RARM typically characterizes these ac-
tions as examples of direct action rather than civil disobedience 
(Milligan 2015, Pellow 2014). Moreover, many RARM activ-
ists position themselves as politically anarchist, anti-statist, 
and anti-capitalist (Best 2014, Pellow 2014). Indeed, the US and 
UK take these self-presentations at face value, responding to 
RARM by introducing increasingly draconian legislation that 
treats them as terrorists (Best 2014, McCausland, O’Sullivan 
and Brenton 2013, O’Sullivan 2011, Pellow 2014). RARM is 
thus construed as “illogical, wicked and immoral—a threat 
to security or civil order, a product of inchoate or dangerous 
minds, and an act of unlawful rebellion and terrorism” (Theo-
dossopoulos 2014, 422).
One response from scholars to this overreaction is to recon-
ceive RARM actions not as terrorism but rather civil disobe-
dience. Unlike terrorism, such actions do not threaten or visit 
physical violence against persons (Milligan 2015, Pellow 2014). 
Moreover, while not defined primarily as public communica-
tive acts, many RARM acts have communicative intent like 
civil disobedience (McCausland, O’Sullivan & Brenton 2013; 
Milligan 2015). The advantage of this approach is that it would 
entitle RARM activists to special standing and tolerance by 
the state denied to terrorists (Milligan 2015). Nevertheless, 
it remains deeply challenging (von Essen 2016b) because of 
the perceived ineligibility of non-human animals as subjects 
of justice on whose behalf redress can be legitimately made 
(Wellsmith 2011).
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Hence, we consider a different approach to the legitimation 
of RARM acts, reconceiving them in light of a recent literature 
on vigilantism (Trottier 2017, Serracino-Inglott 2013). Vigilan-
tism has a ‘bad rap’ with most of the public and officials of the 
state, especially in light of the willingness of vigilantes to re-
sort to violence unsanctioned by the state (Johnson 1996). Nev-
ertheless, we detach vigilantism from its most publicly con-
troversial aspect: physical violence to persons. Non-violent or 
ethical (Serracino-Inglott 2013) vigilantism is consistent with 
RARM’s refusal to take violent action against persons as op-
posed to property (Flükiger 2008, Milligan 2015, Pellow 2014). 
Moreover, based on popular movies, vigilantism enjoys a cul-
tural resonance with the public that terrorism does not (Dums-
day 2009). 
 Vigilantism is often an expression of right-wing angst over 
the state not doing its job of securing justice and protecting the 
vulnerable from criminal aggression (Johnson 1996). This is 
not an anarchist rejection of legitimate state authority as much 
as an expression of disappointment with that state for failing 
to do what it is supposed to do. Nevertheless, vigilantism may 
also express deep skepticism about the hierarchically-ordered 
state (Serracino-Inglott 2013). From this alternative anarchist 
point of view, the hierarchal state is answerable only to power-
ful elites whose interests lie in exploiting the most vulnerable 
members of society, human or animal (Pellow 2014; Best 2014). 
It is thus up to ethical individuals to take charge in matters 
of justice, acting independently of the state and its exclusive 
claims to legitimate authority (Serracino-Inglott 2013). 
 Nevertheless, like vigilantism, anarchy can exist within the 
parameters of the state (Leipold 2015). Although self-avowed 
anarchists, RARM activists are pragmatists willing to use ‘any 
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tool in the toolbox,’ including law (Pellow 2014). However, 
their primary allegiance is to their own minimally defensible 
conception of justice (Serracino-Inglott 2013) not the principle 
of constitutional law (Rawls 1971). Our claim is that RARM 
activists are non-violent, ethical anarchist vigilantes whose 
foremost concern is with responding to violations of justice 
against vulnerable non-human animals (henceforth animals), 
according to their minimally defensible conception of interspe-
cies justice. 
First, we present a taxonomy of RARM direct actions. Sec-
ond, we argue that these actions are neither terrorist nor civilly 
disobedient. Third, we reassess our taxonomy in light of ethi-
cal vigilantism. We then conclude by asking whether the state 
owes special standing and toleration to non-violent ethical vigi-
lantes, defending vulnerable animals. 
A Taxonomy of RARM Direct Actions
In this section, we present a brief taxonomy of the kinds of 
direct actions undertaken by RARM. These are direct actions, 
because they target persons and institutions directly respon-
sible for grave injustices done to animals. In other words, they 
eschew targeting persons or institutions deemed by activists to 
be of high symbolic value but not directly responsible for such 
injustices. 
We begin by following the taxonomy developed by Hadley 
(2009) in response to the designation of RARM by the US and 
UK as terrorist: (1) attacks on property, (2) attacks on persons, 
(3) hybrid attacks on property and persons. However, we then 
add a couple of distinct items to the taxonomy. 
Attacks on Property
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Direct actions by RARM run from minor to major property 
damage. These attacks mostly target animal research facilities 
but sometimes also target factories and fur farms. They range 
from “spraying graffiti, smashing windows, gluing locks, and 
damaging vehicles” to attacks resulting in multi-million dol-
lars’ worth of damage, as in an attack on the animal research 
facility at University of California at Davis (Hadley 2009, p. 
365). 
Hadley focuses primarily on the intention of activists to 
cause economic damage or disruption to institutions respon-
sible for injustices to animals. Such economic damage or dis-
ruption is not wanton or malicious to the extent that it aims 
primarily to fulfill a negative duty of justice. This is to degrade 
the capacity of the institution in question to continue perpetrat-
ing grave injustices against animals. Ultimately, the goal is to 
disincentive continued injustices done to animals by making 
the economic cost of such injustices too high (Seel 1997). Nev-
ertheless, it may also produce the unintended consequence of 
instilling fear in the owners or users of the damaged property. 
To this extent, it may have a disincentivization effect based 
not on economic self-interest but fear. Hadley acknowledges 
activists may sometimes intend to cause fear in the owners or 
uses of the property or have the dual-intention to cause both 
property damage and fear. 
Attacks on Persons
Direct attacks on persons do not involve bodily injury to 
them but rather “written or verbal threats via graffiti, tele-
phone, post, or email, or in person” ( 367). Indeed, the latter 
may entail “stalking behavior” or “intimidatory protest.” Viz., 
activists “will stand outside the home of an individual con-
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nected to animal research, often holding graphic placards and 
yelling abuse but frequently just seeking to engage them, or 
their neighbors, in a debate about animal research” (Ibid). Nev-
ertheless, the effect of the protest is to cause fear or alarm in 
the individual. Intimidation is an intended consequence. That 
said, however, intimidation is not wanton or malicious. Again, 
the intention is to fulfil a duty of justice by incentivizing the 
individual to desist activities perpetrating more injustices on 
animals. 
However, incentivization through intimidation may have 
two different aims. One is to cause the individual to desist from 
doing injustice to animals out of a desire to stop the stalking 
and intimidation. Another is to cause the individual to desist 
through persuasion and debate, changing her mind about the 
ethics of animal research. Intimidation is thus intended as an 
opening move towards establishing a moral dialogue. To this 
extent, it may be compared to deliberative disobedience (Smith 
2013). Nevertheless, intimidation obviously cannot guarantee 
deliberative uptake from its targets. 
Hybrid Attacks on both Property and Persons
Finally, Hadley considers hybrid attacks on both property 
and persons, whereby activists damage property while leav-
ing behind threatening messages “scrawled on walls or left in 
notes on workstations” (367). Such “threatening graffiti” might 
exhibit either of the above intentions. Activists likelier intend 
to incentivize researchers to desist from injustice to animals. 
Nevertheless, it is also possible that threatening graffiti insti-
gates a moral dialogue among researchers about the ethics of 
their research. Hettinger (2007) contends intimidation neces-
sarily blurs the line between attacks toward property and per-
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sons: those who own property are going to be hurt by damage 
to it. 
We find Hadley’s tripartite taxonomy helpful but incom-
plete. Hence, we now add two other categories distinct from 
damage to property, persons, or both: animal rescue as well as 
trespass and publicity. 
Animal Rescue
Hadley acknowledges animal rescue as a key mode of 
RARM direct action. Here, the intention is to rescue or release 
animals from situations in which they are the victims of grave 
injustice, such as animal experiment facilities, factories, or fur 
farms. However, he tries to treat animal rescue as a subdivi-
sion of damage to property. This is implausible for reasons he 
articulates. Viz., “the removal of sentient property from cir-
cumstances in which they are being mistreated does not, intui-
tively, seem to warrant being labeled as an instance of property 
damage” (p. 366). 
Indeed, it is more intuitively property theft. Nevertheless, 
it is not theft for malicious reasons or even for personal gain. 
From the perspective of RARM activists, animal rescue is an 
act of liberation morally equivalent to liberating human slaves 
from the plantation-system in the Ante Bellum South (Fran-
cione and Charlton 2015), or liberating Jews or Gypsies from 
Treblinka (Patterson 2002). 
Trespass and Publicity
Sometimes the intention of RARM activists is not to dam-
age property or to steal anything as much as trespass on pri-
vate property. This is done to gather information about injus-
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tices committed against animals that are concealed from public 
view (McCausland, O’Sullivan and Brenton 2013, O’Sullivan 
2011, Trottier 2017) notes this is an especially important public 
service in the case of environmental and animal harms, which 
are time-sensitive and difficult to monitor. To be sure, minor 
property damage, such as breaking locks, often results from 
trespass. However, the intention is not to raise the economic 
costs of treating animals unjustly for the property owners. In-
stead, it is to gain, say, video evidence of the cruel treatment 
of animals that activists may use subsequently for a media and 
publicity campaign. Such a campaign may involve ‘naming and 
shaming’ an institution and individuals who work for it. Never-
theless, it is distinct from intimidation of particular institutions 
and individuals insofar as trespass aims at widespread public 
address. In this way, it is similar to whistle-blowing (Kumar 
2013). 
Of course, a RARM direct action might also be a hybrid 
combining damage to property and persons with animal res-
cue, trespass and publicity. That said, however, we next wish to 
add two further categories overlapping the other items in our 
taxonomy. 
Violation of Privacy
RARM direct action rarely targets the state. Instead, it usu-
ally targets private actors, businesses, universities, and indi-
viduals. To this extent, it violates private property rights, as 
in the cases of trespass and property damage, and the rights 
of individuals, deemed guilty by activists of animal cruelty, to 
withdraw into private life, as in the cases of stalking, intimi-
dation, naming and shaming. Indeed, RARM activists often 
violate the privacy of individual deemed culpable of injustices 
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to animals by distributing the private information—names, 
home addresses, and so on—of such individual through digital 
media.
This stress on violation of privacy is important, because it 
plays a role in helping us to distinguish RARM direct actions 
from terrorism and civil disobedience. It also helps us to align 
many such actions, instead, with vigilantism. 
Covertness
Often, but not always, RARM direct actions are covert in 
the sense that the activists conceal their identities and seek to 
avoid any legal penalties associated with attacks they under-
take against property or persons. Here, Milligan (2015) distin-
guishes between actions that are covert and actions that are 
open in the sense that at least some activists make no attempt 
to conceal their identities. The orientation to covert, as opposed 
to open forms of direct action is often more than mere self-
preservation, being a function of the political ideology of the 
activists, as anarchist or statist respectively. 
We shall discuss this difference of ideologies shortly. In the 
next section, we consider why the actions in our taxonomy are 
not correctly categorized as terrorist or civilly disobedient.
Terrorism and Civil Disobedience
Terrorism
Are RARM direct actions instances of terrorism? The gov-
ernments of the US and UK have introduced draconian leg-
islation treating them as such. However like Hadley (2009), 
Yates (2011), Milligan (2015), Pellow (2014), and Best (2014), 
we believe this is a conceptual mistake. We offer several rea-
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sons in support of this claim. While definitions of terrorism are 
controversial, a key feature of terrorism agreed upon by most 
scholars is that it entails indirect, secondary, or tertiary tar-
geting. Indeed, terror is a function of randomness in targeting 
(Schinkel 2006; Goodin 2006). Terrorists make no discrimina-
tion between the guilty and innocent. Even if I have no direct 
responsibility for the injustice motivating a terrorist action, I or 
my children could be its victims. 
 However, RARM actions directly target those responsible 
for injustices to animals. They do not entail indirect, tertiary, 
or secondary targeting. Neither do they entail bodily injury to 
persons. They may induce fear and alarm among targeted in-
dividuals as previously noted. Nevertheless, this does not rise 
to the level of terror created by random or indiscriminate tar-
geting. To this extent, even RARM intimidatory protests are 
not terrorism. Further, terrorism entails a political message that 
is usually directed towards the state entailing some demand 
for some change of state policy. As we have noted above, AR 
direct actions are usually directed not towards the state (with 
some exceptions (Seel 1997)) but rather various actors in the 
private sector as the primary subjects of coercion. Sometimes 
ordinary citizens, like recreational hunters, become the target 
for RARM actions, including sabotage (von Essen and Allen 
2017). This is not to deny that the goal of RARM activism is 
sometimes also to facilitate reform of state policy, as in the 
case of trespassing for the purpose gathering information to be 
disseminated to the public. Nevertheless, the state is addressed 
only indirectly through the mediation of the public. 
Hadley (2009) notes, however, that some RARM activism 
might cross a line into terrorism if the targeting becomes in-
creasingly strained and potentially random. This might be the 
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case when activists resort to the secondary targeting for intimi-
datory protest of publicans serving drinks to animal research 
scientists, even though the threat of bodily injury remains ab-
sent. Walker et al. (2008) calls this proxy targeting. 
Civil Disobedience
Are RARM direct actions civilly disobedient as opposed to 
terrorist? Civil disobedience can certainly encompass direct 
action targeting culpable private sector actors, as when civil 
rights disobedients ‘occupied’ the lunch counter at a Whites-
Only Woolworth. Further, it is committed to non-violence. 
This entails a prohibition on causing bodily injury to persons 
and often, but not always, causing damage to property (Allen 
2009, Corlett 2003). Nevertheless, it is strongly committed to 
open rather than covert protest with disobedients accepting the 
legal penalties for their actions. Openness is tied to public com-
munication and the presupposition that a public informed about 
injustice will be motivated to challenge the state to change un-
just law and policy (Rawls 1971). 
Given these defining features of civil disobedience, at least 
some AR direct actions will qualify as civilly disobedient. 
For example, Milligan (2015) argues that animal rescue could 
so qualify as long as rescues are open or, even if covert, they 
satisfy general conditions of civility, such as the recognition 
of others and the avoidance of violence and threats. Likewise, 
McCausland, O’Sullivan and Brenton (2013) argue trespass 
qualifies as civilly disobedient provided the information gath-
ered is used in public policy formation. Nevertheless, covert 
animal rescue remains an awkward fit for civil disobedience. 
This is especially so in the case of RARM activists whose 
political ideology is anti-statist or anarchist (Pellow 2014). 
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Indeed, civil disobedience entails ideological commitment to 
the liberal-democratic state and the principle of the rule of 
law (Rawls 1971). It presupposes that the state is an engine of 
justice that is open to reform through public communication 
when it fails to do the right thing. However, RARM activists 
frequently dismiss any such belief in the reformability of the 
state as naïve or mythological (Best 2014), given the extent to 
which it is captive to the financial interests of corporate elites. 
The reformist aspirations of trespass, for the purpose of gather-
ing information to shape public policy, align more clearly with 
civil disobedience, but this orientation is difficult to reconcile 
with the anti-statism of RARM.
In short, politically moderate, reformist and open versions of 
RARM may qualify as civilly disobedient. Perhaps the clear-
est example of civilly disobedient direct action, in defense of 
vulnerable animals, is Animal Liberation Victoria, whose tres-
pass operations satisfied key civility and openness conditions 
(McCausland, et al 2013). Nevertheless, it is debatable whether 
more radical expressions of direct action—including property 
damage (as necessarily also hurting people) along with threats 
and intimidation (which may or may not result in moral dia-
logue)—are civilly disobedient.
Vigilantism
Our purpose now is to reassess our taxonomy of RARM 
direct action in light of vigilantism as opposed to terrorism and 
civil disobedience. To this end, we begin by quickly reviewing 
the standard definition of vigilantism and then some adjust-
ments to the standard definition proposed by scholars of digital 
media. Here, we appeal first to Johnson’s (1996) definition as 
reconstructed by Dumsday (2009):
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Premeditation/organization (organization in the sense 
of an organized activity, not necessarily undertaken by 
a group);
Violence or the threat of violence;
This violence or threat of violence is undertaken by 
autonomous citizens, not agents of the state;
The vigilantism is in reaction to a breach of institution-
alized values, or at least what is viewed as a breach or 
potential breach;
The motivation for the vigilantism is twofold: first, to 
control (prevent or inhibit) criminal or non-criminal, 
but still deviant, acts. Second, to offer greater peace of 
mind to members of the relevant social order (Dums-
day 2009, 50). 
How does this standard definition measure up against the 
various elements in our taxonomy of RARM direct actions? 
That is, attacks on property; attacks on persons; hybrid attacks 
on property and persons; animal rescue; trespassing and pub-
licity; violation of privacy; covertness. 
All are clearly premeditated and organized rather than spon-
taneous or random. Moreover, violence or the threat of vio-
lence is central to most such actions. In Johnson’s definition, 
however, violence or the threat thereof may extend to actual 
bodily injury or threats of such injury. Indeed, without at least 
the threat of violence, vigilantism would be ineffective (Bur-
rows 1976). However, as we stressed in our taxonomy, RARM 
direct action rejects bodily injury to non-human and human 
animals. Physical damage is limited to property, not persons. 
Michael Allen and Erica von Essen
273
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 22, Issue 1
Nevertheless, these actions are ineffective without recourse to 
violence and threats. Consequently, violence and threats are 
integral to the success of RARM direct actions. After all, the 
activists’ intention when attacking property, persons, or both, 
is to disincentivize institutions and individuals from continuing 
to perpetrate injustices against animals. 
This is quite different from civil disobedience in which 
theorists sometimes insist that civilly disobedient actions are 
“never a threat” (Rawls 1971) but rather invitations to the wider 
public to reconsider the entailments of constitutional princi-
ples. Some direct actions come closer to the civil disobedience 
ideal of public communication than do others. Trespassing and 
publicity come closest, as stressed by McCausland, O’Sullivan 
and Brenton (2013). That said, however, stalking, intimidation, 
and threatening graffiti are of a quite different order. They are 
neither terroristic, for the reasons we have already given, nor 
are they civilly disobedient modes of general public address 
(Allen 2009). Nevertheless, to qualify as vigilante on Johnson’s 
definition, such RARM direct actions must respond to a breach 
of institutionalized values. In this respect, however, they fail to 
square with this definition. Indeed, the values of animal libera-
tion—such as species egalitarianism—are not entrenched in 
established social institutions. On the contrary, the established 
norms of society support unequal consideration for non-human 
and human animals. 
Further, RARM direct action inhibits non-criminal acts. 
Here, we say ‘non-criminal,’ because animal experimentation, 
the factory farming of animals, and many forms of hunting—
against which RARM is directed today—are legal. It may also 
inhibit criminal acts committed by researchers, farmers or 
hunters, if animal research, factory farming, or hunting vio-
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lates existing animal cruelty law, as in the case of the direct 
actions of the guerilla animal protection group, Anti Poaching 
Unit, seeking to ward off illegal hunters of wolves in Sweden 
(von Essen 2016a). For the most part, however, RARM direct 
action inhibit acts that deviate not from established institution-
al values but rather their own non-public code of ethics. When 
hunt saboteurs operate in Sweden, they disregard the fact that 
public acceptance of hunting, today, is at a staggering 89 per-
cent (Swedish Hunting Association, 2018). While the activists 
clearly believe in the moral justifiability of their operations, 
their code of ethics is not that of the public at large. This stands 
in contrast with the vigilante group, Guardian Angels of New 
York, that acted to protect NY citizens vulnerable to criminally 
deviant gangs on the subway when the NY police department 
failed in their duty to protect and serve. Hence, the Guard-
ian Angels did what the public believed the law enforcement 
branch of the state ought to be doing but was not. 
The citizens of NY saw it as uncontroversial that they ought 
to be protected against criminal gangs. They may have had 
reservations about vigilantes rather than police providing such 
protection, and they undoubtedly would have preferred the po-
lice to be doing their job so that a need for vigilante protect had 
not arisen. Nevertheless, they could clearly see a convergence 
of their values and those of the vigilantes. Consequently, the 
Guardian Angels could rightly claim to offer ‘greater peace of 
mind’ to the public. On the one hand, New Yorkers were un-
easy about vigilante justice, but on the other hand, they were 
reassured about traveling on the subway without fear of getting 
mugged. In sum, public reaction to vigilantism is mixed or am-
bivalent. The values of the public and vigilantes may or not be 
aligned, but the public is reassured in an area its members care 
about profoundly: personal security. 
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However, public ambivalence regarding RARM direct ac-
tion runs much deeper. Public reaction is likelier to be: ‘Well, 
it’s not that we like harming animals for no good reason, but 
animal research might save human lives and humans have to 
come first, don’t they? This is nothing like protecting subway 
commuters from criminal gangs.’ RARM direct action nec-
essarily confronts the public with deeply troubling questions 
about the propriety of its present commitment to species ine-
galitarianism. These actions unsettle or disturb citizens’ peace 
of mind: ‘Oh, alright then, so conditions in the factory farm 
aren’t so good, but do I really have to give up eating meat?’ 
However, such questions arise for the public from RARM di-
rect action regardless of the intentions of the specific RARM 
activists. 
Consequently, RARM direct action fails to satisfy key 
features of Johnson’s definition of vigilantism: the values of 
RARM activists do not converge with those of the wider pub-
lic and activists indeed disturb or unsettle the public’s peace 
of mind. Moreover, his definition contradicts RARM activists’ 
explicit disavowal of violence against person as opposed to in-
timidation. 
That said, however, Serracino-Inglott (2013, 221) offers a 
revised definition of vigilantism in light of the example of the 
cyber-vigilantism of Anonymous; viz., a vigilante action must:
be conducted by agents not willingly accountable to 
the state;
be an organized or premeditated action;
be in accordance with the vigilante’s own system of 
minimally defensible beliefs;
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be motivated by concern for the justice or the good of 
the community;
use violence specifically directed against the infringer 
of norms. 
Based on his case study of Anonymous, Serracino-Inglott’s 
definition is highly relevant to our case study of radical RARM. 
RARM direct action, in defense of vulnerable animals, largely 
satisfies Serracino-Inglott’s revised definition of vigilantism. 
Serracino-Inglott applies his definition to the case of cyber-vig-
ilantism. In this regard, some RARM direct actions—such as 
posting the names and addresses of animal research scientists 
online or the online harassment of the shooter of Cecil the Lion 
(Büscher, Koot and Nelson 2017)—are cyber-vigilante. Never-
theless, most RARM direct actions— physical property dam-
age, physical intimidation of persons— take place in the real 
world, as opposed to in the virtual world. Consequently, we 
also apply his definition to the real world instances of RARM 
activism. 
 Serracino-Inglott and Johnson agree that vigilantism is or-
ganized and premeditated. They also agree that it entails vio-
lence or the threat of violence. Nevertheless, this is as problem-
atic in the case of Anonymous as RARM given the former also 
explicitly rejects violence against persons (Serracino-Inglott 
2013). Like Johnson, though, Serracino-Inglott captures the 
idea of vigilantism as concerned with direct targeting of the 
guilty, as opposed to secondary or tertiary targeting of the in-
nocent in terrorism. 
Otherwise, their definitions otherwise vary considerably 
with Serracino-Inglott coming closer overall to capturing the 
distinctive features of RARM direct action. Unlike moder-
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ate AR activism aligning with civil disobedience rather than 
terrorism (Milligan 2014; McCausland et al 2013), RARM 
activists resort to covert or ‘anonymous’ operations, in either 
physical or virtual space. Neither RARM nor Anonymous see 
themselves as willingly accountable to the state and the princi-
ple of the constitutional rule of law. Like RARM, Anonymous 
is ideologically anarchist (Serracino-Inglott 2013). It is deeply 
skeptical about the hierarchically ordered state and its capacity 
to ‘do the right thing.’ If the Guardian Angels believed in the 
state and wanted it to do its job by protecting citizens, RARM 
and Anonymous view the state as inherently prone to corrup-
tion (Pellow 2014, Best 2014). From their shared anarchist per-
spective, both see it as foolish at best to expect the state reliably 
to do the right thing. 
Autonomous citizens (Wolff 1970) must be prepared to act 
independently of the state to satisfy minimal conditions of jus-
tice (Serracino-Inglott 2013) according to their own assessment 
of the entailments of those conditions. In this respect, Serrac-
ino-Inglott corrects the major failures of Johnson’s definition 
we identified above. The values of RARM activists do not 
align with those of the wider public. Like Anonymous, RARM 
activists respond to breaches of their own minimally defensible 
belief-system rather than breaches of— or deviations from—
socially entrenched values, institutionalized by the legal or-
der of the constitutional state. To this extent, contrary to the 
Guardian Angels protecting citizens from subway muggings, 
RARM and Anonymous disturb or unsettle rather than restore 
(Johnston 1996) the public’s peace of mind. 
Further, the public may be more ambivalent about the belief-
system of RARM than Anonymous. For example, Serracino-
Inglott (2013) argues that direct actions by Anonymous against 
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corporations and individuals threatening downloaders of copy-
righted material with lawsuits are minimally defensible, be-
cause the public increasingly sees such copyright enforcement 
tactics as bordering on extortion. This inevitably confronts 
members of the public with difficult questions about copyright 
and extortion in the digital context. However, as we noted earli-
er, RARM direct actions confront the public with fundamental 
questions about the moral standing of humanity in relation to 
other species, its hypocrisy concerning institutionalized cruel-
ty to exploited animals, and value of animal life as being equal 
or unequal to human life. Despite advances in animal rights 
and animal welfare in recent decades, most members of the 
public would likely find these questions more unsettling than 
questions about copyright and extortion. 
 Nevertheless, RARM activists can still lay claim to the 
minimal public defensibility of their belief-system. In this re-
spect, Hadley (2009) appeals to a principle of third party de-
fense in the case of a domestic dispute in man who threw his 
girlfriend’s live kittens into a fire. Hadley contents intuitively, 
“if animals matter morally at all, then it is permissible to forci-
bly restrain someone who is about to burn animals out of spite” 
(369). Indeed, RARM activists could appeal to third party de-
fense in protecting vulnerable animals as underwriting their 
abolitionist and liberationist belief-system. For example, they 
might claim the right of third party defense when rescuing or 
liberating animals or destroying lab equipment used to harm 
especially vulnerable captive animals. 
That said, however, such appeals to third party defense are 
unlikely to resolve public ambivalence concerning RARM. 
Serracino-Inglott (2013) insists that vigilantes must act for the 
common good of the community. Saving cherished kittens 
Michael Allen and Erica von Essen
279
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 22, Issue 1
from a fiery death is surely acting for the community’s good. 
Nevertheless, the public might, on reflection, side with non-ab-
olitionist, non-liberationist animal welfare scholars who con-
tend some forms of animal husbandry (Smith 2012) or thera-
peutic animal experimentation (Cochrane 2012) are compatible 
with the common good of the community. Even if that were so, 
however, it does nothing to undermine our claim that RARM 
direct actions satisfy key features of Serracino-Inglott’s defini-
tion. At most, it shows that RARM activists appeal to a public-
ly defensible principle, but that its proper scope of application 
is a matter of ongoing controversy. Moreover, their motivation 
is clearly a concern for the community’s common good, but 
their understanding of the common good is not widely shared 
by the community. 
 Overall, then, RARM direct actions fit Serracino-Inglott’s 
definitional criteria for vigilantism, with the singular exception 
of violence. Nevertheless, as we noted above, his definition of 
vigilantism also fails in this latter respect in the case of Anony-
mous. However, he argues this final “element of vigilantism is 
punishment, not violence” (232). At any rate, it is a form of rep-
robative punishment, expressing severe disapproval. Hence, as 
in our earlier example, Anonymous expresses reprobation, or 
disapproval, for corporations and individuals threatening law-
suits against downloaders not through the institutions of the 
state, but rather “sentiments and sensitivities manifested in the 
new trends” (Pratt 2000, 153) of digital culture. As for RARM, 
its activists express reprobation, or disapproval, for institutions 
and individuals responsible for injustices to animals in facto-
ries, fur farms, scientific facilities, and so on. Indeed, they ex-
press their reprobation not through the state, but the sentiments 
and sensitivities of RARM’s emerging activist culture (Pellow 
2014). This supplements Hadley’s (2009) emphasis on inten-
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tionality in raising the costs of harming animals, intimidation, 
naming and shaming, trespassing and information dissemina-
tion, and so on. Indeed, the intent to express reprobation, or se-
vere disapproval, underscores all of the items in the taxonomy 
of RARM direct actions. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, we turn to the question of what, if anything, 
the state owes to RARM activists by way of special standing 
and toleration analogous to civil disobedients (Milligan 2015). 
Nevertheless, as anarchists and anti-statists (Pellow 2014, Best 
2014), RARM activists are clearly different from civil dis-
obedients whose allegiance is ultimately to the principle of 
constitutional law. To this extent, the state does not owe them 
any special standing and tolerance as ‘loyal’ dissenters (Allen 
2017). However, even if RARM activists disavow allegiance to 
the constitutional regime, we contend the state does owe them 
some consideration and tolerance based on the ethical inten-
tions of their direct actions in defense of animals. Indeed, as 
a breed of non-violent left-wing vigilantes, RARM activists 
show concern for justice and the common good, as they under-
stand it. Moreover, they can satisfy at least minimal standards 
of public defensibility— such as third party defense —for their 
controversial beliefs about justice and the common good. Con-
sequently, at the very least, the state owes it to RARM activists 
not to treat them as terrorists, breaching all standards of public 
defensibility through indirect, random targeting. Indeed, we 
believe the draconian penalties currently imposed on RARM 
activists under current US and UK terrorism laws are dispro-
portionate and morally illegitimate. 
Further, we contend the state may also owe them special 
standing and tolerance through leniency in criminal sentencing 
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(Ibid) as vigilantes for animal rights. In this respect, RARM 
vigilantes are in a quite different position from civil disobedi-
ents who challenge breaches of constitutional rights in cases 
of racism or sexism. Indeed, the constitutional order already 
recognizes species-specific equality among all humans. How-
ever, it does not recognize cross-species equality as a founda-
tional principle of social justice. In this respect, we contend the 
reprobative function of RARM vigilantism is a consequence 
of the novelty of an emerging belief-system, controversially 
attributing equal value to the lives and suffering of animals. 
This places the constitutional state in the position to demon-
strate tolerance for challenges to its present regime of tolera-
tion (Bohman 2003) which assigns special standing to illegal 
actions in defense of vulnerable humans, but not animals. In-
deed, it calls upon the state to acknowledge that it might not 
be tolerant enough, if it resorts to draconian measures against 
those seeking to extend the ideal of justice to animals. 
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